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CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION AND 1Ob-5 CLAIMS IN THE

WAKE OF SHEARSON/AMERICAN EXPRESS, INC. v.
McMAHON
The validity of superimposing class actions on arbitration proceedings is an open question under federal law. The Supreme

Court's recent decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahonI to compel arbitration of securities fraud claims, however,
makes the classwide arbitration device a likely topic ofjudicial attention in the near future. This Note discusses the merits of a hybrid
device that combines class actions and arbitration, 2 specifically with
regard to suits brought under Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC") Rule lOb-5, 3 promulgated under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 4 It argues that the federal judiciary
should support classwide arbitration, provided the usual due process protections 5 accorded to plaintiffs in class action litigation are
available in the classwide arbitration setting.
In the wake of the McMahon decision, and in light of the advantages to plaintiffs in bringing 1Ob-5 claims as class actions, the federal courts are likely to consider the merits of courts superimposing
class actions on arbitration proceedings in the near future. Now
that the Supreme Court has compelled arbitration in an area traditionally popular for class actions, 6 the next logical question is
whether classwide arbitration is a legitimate device for resolving
10b-5 claims. This Note first examines the arguments for and
against arbitration. Second, it reviews the McMahon decision in light
of the historical background of arbitration. Third, it evaluates the
effectiveness of the class action as an instrument for bringing claims
under Rule 10b-5. Finally, it discusses the merits of combining both
efficiency devices and of developing a federal policy favoring classwide arbitration. 7 This Note argues that in light of the need for effi-

1 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2 For a discussion of the proposed structure of classwide arbitration, see infra
notes 133-56 and accompanying text.
3
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
5 Due process rights in the class action context center around notice requirements
and adequacy of representation. See, e.g., In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 502 F.2d
834, 842 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1786 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter WRIGHT &
MILLER].

6 "With apparent increasing frequency, Rule 23(b)(3) is being utilized in... securities fraud suits." 7B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1781, at 4.
7 While the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the legality of class-
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ciency, the federal courts should approve such a device in lOb-5
actions. It also will recommend methods of ensuring that plaintiffs'
due process rights are protected in classwide arbitration
proceedings.
I
BACKGROUND

A. The Supreme Court's Traditional Refusal to Approve
Arbitration of Securities Claims
Enacted in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")8 contains
strong language favoring arbitration. It states that "[a] written provision in... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 Only in recent years, however, has the Supreme Court
looked favorably upon arbitration proceedings to resolve disputes
arising under various federal statutes.i ° The Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act") t and the Exchange Act are examples of such federal laws in which the Court has contemplated the use of arbitration
to resolve disputes. The Court previously believed that the federal
securities laws guaranteed the right to a judicial proceeding and
prohibited waiver of such rights. It deemed arbitration impermissible even though parties privately had contracted to arbitrate.
The United States Supreme Court first articulated its disapproval of the arbitration of securities disputes in the landmark Wilko
v. Swan ,2 decision. In Wilko, the plaintiff/customer brought suit to
recover for misrepresentation under section 12(2) of the Securities
Act.' 3 The Court held that the agreement between the customer
and the securities broker to arbitrate future controversies was a void
wide arbitration, California's Supreme Court has approved this hybrid device in Keating
v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982), rev'don other
grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
8 Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (current version at 9 U.S.C., §§ i-14 (1982).
9 Id. at § 2. The legislative history of the FAA evidences the intention to extinguish judicial hostility toward arbitration. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 2 (1924) (Congress enacted the FAA in order to place arbitration agreements
"upon the same footing as other contracts .... The [FAA] declares simply that such
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal
courts for their enforcement.").
10
See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
11
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).

12

346 U.S. 427 (1953).

13

See infra note 21 for the relevant text of § 12(2) of the Securities Act.
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"stipulation" under section 14 of the Securities Act.' 4 The Wilko
Court acknowledged the desirability of arbitration as an alternative
to litigation, but concluded that in the case of the Securities Act,
section 14 obstructed the plaintiff's ability to waive his right to select a judicial forum. 1 5 Justice Reed, writing for the majority, asserted that the potential inequities between broker-dealers and
customers were too severe to permit waiver by the customer. The
Court stated that Congress clearly drafted the Securities Act "with
an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor,"' 16 and that
judicial proceedings afford plaintiffs more effective protections than
arbitration.
The Wilko Court's reluctance to resolve Securities Act claims
through arbitration stemmed from the suspicion of arbitration that
prevailed at that time. First, the Court believed that arbitration was
inimical to cases requiring "subjective findings on the purpose and
knowledge of an alleged violator of the [Securities] Act."' 7 The
Court feared that without the benefit of judicial instruction on the
law, the arbitrators would be prone to commit errors on these complicated legal constructs. Second, arbitrators could decide cases
without publishing explanations or complete records of the proceedings, and such unreasoned decisions posed potential dangers of
unfairness.' 8 Third, the high standards established in section 10 of
the FAA for vacation of an arbitral award made appeal overwhelmingly difficult, and exacerbated the foregoing problems.' 9
14 Section 14 of the Securities Act provides that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the [Securities Exchange] Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
15 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
16 Id. at 435.
17 Id at 435-36.

18

Id. at 436. See also R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBrrRATIONS-WHAT You NEED TO

KNOW 29 (3d ed. 1986) ("Written opinions .. identify targets for the losing party to
attack.").
19 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436. Section 10 of the FAA describes the four grounds for
vacation of an arbitral award: 1) fraud or corruption in procuring the award; 2) arbitrator partiality; 3) misconduct of the arbitrators resulting in prejudice to a party; or 4) failure of the arbitrators to reach a "mutual, final, and definite award." 9 U.S.C. § 10
(1982). See Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 456-57 (1981). As that commentator noted:
Courts will not vacate an arbitral award for mistakes of law made by the
arbitrators unless, as a general rule, there is some indication that the arbitrators knew what the applicable law was and simply ignored it or refused
to apply it. Because arbitrators are not required to give reasons for their
decision ....

some commentators question how a dissatisfied arbitrant

can challenge the award on the basis of a manifest disregard of the law.
(footnotes omitted). See also French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784
F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (citingSwift Industries, Inc. v. Botany Industries, Inc., 466
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The Shift Towards Approval of Arbitration

In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,2° the Supreme Court first questioned the applicability of Wilko to claims of manipulation or deception arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and its
companion, Rule 1Ob-5. 2 1 In Scherk, an American manufacturer, the
Alberto-Culver Company, purchased three foreign enterprises, together with their trademark rights. The company negotiated,
signed, and closed the sales contract in five different countries. The
contract contained a representation by the seller that the trademarks
were unencumbered, as well as an arbitration agreement. AlbertoCulver subsequently brought a lOb-5 action claiming fraudulent
misrepresentation because the trademarks were subject to substantial encumbrances. 2 2 The Court upheld the predispute agreement
to arbitrate the Exchange Act claims. Itreasoned that arbitration
proceedings diminished the uncertainty of international contracts
and mitigated the danger that a dispute would be resolved in an
unfriendly setting. 23 Thus, despite the Scherk Court's effort to distinguish Wilko because Scherk's international contract involved
"considerations and policies significantly'different from those found
controlling in Wilko," 2 4 Scherk substantially undermined Wilko's apF.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972)) ("An arbitrator's decision must be upheld unless it is
'completely irrational.' ").
20 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
21
Scherk raised the issue because section 12(2) of the Securities Act (the relevant
section in JVilko) and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act contain different language and
because, unlike section 12(2), section 10(b) does not expressly give rise to a private
cause of action. Section 10(b) states that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person. . .[t]o
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ....any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). The Exchange Act created no explicit private right of action; therefore the courts have created one. See, e.g.,
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6,13 n.9 (1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In contrast, the Securities Act establishes a private
right of action in section 12(2). It asserts that any person who sells a security in violation
of its provisions "shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction." 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1982) (emphasis added). In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225
(1985), Justice White reasoned in his concurrence that because the private right of action in section 10(b) is implied, section 29, the nonwaiver provision of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982), "is thus literally inapplicable."
22
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508-09.
23
Id. at 516.
24
In Wilko, American law clearly applied and the federal securities laws governed
disputes arising out of the stock-purchase agreement. In contrast, the Scherk Court discussed international conflict-of-laws problems, stating that "considerable uncertainty
existed at the time of the agreement, and still exists, concerning the law applicable to the
resolution of disputes arising out of the contract [between Scherk and Alberto-Culver
Company]." Id.
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plicability to lOb-5 claims. 2 5
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd2 6 dealt the next blow to Wilko.
The Byrd Court held that the FAA requires district courts to compel

arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims. The Court elected to reserve decision on the applicability of Wilko to lOb-5 claims because
Dean Witter had failed to seek arbitration of the federal securities
claims in the trial court. 2 7 Justice White's concurrence, however,
noted that the Court's analysis of arbitration of Securities Act claims
in Wilko would not necessarily apply to Exchange Act claims such as
those involved in Byrd.2 8 Because the applicable provisions under
the two Acts are different, Justice White stated that "Wilko's reasoning cannot be mechanically transplanted to the [Exchange] Act," 2 9
and that "contrary holdings of the lower courts must be viewed with
some doubt." 30 Together, Scherk and Byrd demonstrated a softening
in the Court's attitude towards the arbitrability of lOb-5 claims, and
they set the stage for the McMahon decision.
II

McMahon and the Decision to Compel Arbitration
A.

The Facts

The McMahons were Shearson/American Express ("Shearson") customers between 1980 and 1982. Julia McMahon signed
two brokerage agreements that called for the arbitration of any controversy between Shearson and the McMahons relating to the
McMahons' accounts. 3 ' In 1984, the McMahons filed a complaint
against Shearson and its registered representative who handled
25 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229. Until the McMahon decision, however, numerous district courts and courts of appeals continued to apply the IWilko analysis to 1Ob-5 claims in
the aftermath of Scherk and held that agreements to arbitrate such claims were unenforceable. See, e.g., DeLancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255, 1258-59 (9th Cir.
1981); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 434
U.S. 824 (1977); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D.
Tex. 1974). See also cases cited infra note 36.
26 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
27 Id. at 216 n.l. While the Court did not determine the arbitrability of lOb-5
claims, it acknowledged the federal policy requiring that courts "rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate." Id. at 221.
28 Id. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 225.
31 The McMahons' arbitration provision stated in pertinent part:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising
out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to
this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in
accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223.
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their accounts. The McMahons alleged, inter alia, violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and of Rule lOb-5, specifically charging their broker with churning their accounts,3 2 making misleading
statements, and omitting material facts from her advice.3 3 Shearson
responded that pursuant to the brokerage agreements and section 3
of the FAA, 34 which orders courts to stay judicial action until arbitration is sought and completed, the court should compel arbitration of the claims. On the lOb-5 issue, the district court found that
the McMahons' Exchange Act claims were arbitrable based on the
35
Byrd decision and the strong national policy favoring arbitration.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's ruling. The court concluded that it previously had extended
Wilko's bar against arbitration to lOb-5 claims, and that, notwithstanding the doubt cast on such decisions by Byrd and Scherk, it was
36
bound by the "clear judicial precedent in [that] Circuit."
32
"Churning occurs when a broker, exercising control over the volume and frequency of trades, abuses his customer's confidence for personal gain by initiating transactions that are excessive in view of the character of [the] account and the customer's
objectives as expressed by the broker." BlACK's LAiv DICTIONARY 220 (5th ed. 1979).
33 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223.
34 Section 3 of the FAA states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon
being satisfied that the issue involved ... is referable to arbitration ....
shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding
with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
35 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225-26.
36
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1986),
rev'd in pertinentpart,482 U.S. 220 (1987). The Second Circuit had long denied compulsory arbitration to claims under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., AFP Imaging
Corp. v. Ross, 780 F.2d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1004 (1986); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Greater
Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d Cir. 1970); Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
Seven other circuits have held similarly. See Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032
(11 th Cir. 1986) (en banc);Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797
F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986); King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59 (5th Cir
1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 922 (1987) (in light of McMahon); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986) vacated, 482 U.S. 923 (1987) (in light of McMahon); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977). But see Page v.
Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 295 (1st Cir. 1986) ("We
are persuaded by the result reached by the Eighth Circuit, although for somewhat different reasons, and rule that, where parties agree to arbitrate a lOb-5 dispute, this agreement is largely enforceable."); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
795 F.2d 1393, 1395 (8th Cir. 1986), which enforced an agreement to arbitrate section
10(b) claims ("We believe ... that the Supreme Court's opinions in Scherk and Byrd have
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The Supreme Court Decision
1.

The Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice
O'Connor, reversed the Second Circuit's decision and held that the
McMahons' Exchange Act claims were arbitrable under the provisions of the FAA.
a. Policies Underlying the FederalArbitrationAct
Commencing its opinion with a discussion of the FAA, the
Court noted that Congress enacted the FAA to " 'revers[e] centuries
ofjudicial hostility to arbitration agreements' "37 by " 'plac[ing] arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts." ' "3 8 Thus congressional intent indicated that a "'federal
policy favoring arbitration' " exists 39 that required the rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements. The Court stated that the
FAA "'provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into
arbitrability.' "40 Furthermore, " '[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial forum.' "4' Thus the duty to enforce arbitration
agreements prevails when a party raises a statutory claim, 4 2 unless
Congress intended to require adjudication when it enacted the particular statute.
b.

Substantive Rights Under the Securities and the Exchange Acts

Second, the Court examined the differences between the substantive rights created under the Exchange and Securities Acts. Justice O'Connor compared the nonwaiver provisions, the civil
liabilities provisions, and the jurisdictional provisions in the two
44
Acts. 43 Wilko ruled that the Securities Act's nonwaiver provision
invited a reexamination of the applicability of Wilko to claims arising under section 10(b)
of the [Exchange] Act and Rule 10b-5.").
37
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225, quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510.
38 Id. at 225-26, quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 511, quoting H.R. REP. 96,68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 2 (1924).
39
Id., quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983).
40 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226, quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432.
41 Id. at 229-30, quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
42 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
43 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 771(2), and 77v (1982) (Securities Act provisions), with
15 U.S.C. §§ 78cc, 78j(b), and 78aa (1982) (Exchange Act provisions).
44 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). For the relevant text of Securities Act section 14, see
supra note 14.
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prohibited waiver of the right to enforce the civil liabilities section 4 5
in a state or federal court as provided by the jurisdictional provision.46 In McMahon, the Court questioned whether the Exchange
Act's nonwaiver provision 4 7 prohibited waiver of the right to enforce its civil liabilities provision 48 in a judicial forum in light of its
jurisdictional provision 4 9 that restricts jurisdiction to federal courts.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the antiwaiver provision of the Exchange Act, which the McMahons claimed prohibited waiver of the
jurisdictional provision, forbids waiver of compliance with the Act.
However, because the jurisdictional provision "does not impose any
statutory duties, its waiver does not constitute a waiver of 'compliance with any provision' of the Exchange Act under § 29(a)." 5 °
That is, a customer's agreement with a broker-dealer to forego adjudicative recourse in favor of arbitration is irrelevant to the question
of the broker's "compliance" with the provisions of the Exchange
Act. Therefore, Shearson did not violate the antiwaiver provision of
the Exchange Act because the McMahons did not waive any substantive obligations.
In light of this comparison, the McMahon Court did not distinguish Wilko statutorily. Instead, it asserted that an agreement to arbitrate a lOb-5 claim no longer implies a waiver of the plaintiff's
substantive rights because of the great improvements in arbitration
as a means of recourse. 51 The Court argued that Wilko must be understood as holding the waiver of section 22 impermissible "only because arbitration was judged inadequate to enforce the statutory
rights created by § 12(2)."52 McMahon distinguished Wilko on the
ground that arbitration has become the "functional equivalent" of
45
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). For the relevant text of Securities Act section 12(2),
see supra note 21.
46
H'ilko, 346 U.S. at 435-38. Section 22 of the Securities Act (the jurisdictional
provision) establishes in part that "[t]he district courts of the United States and the
United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations
under this Subchapter...." 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982).
47
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). For the relevant text of Exchange Act section 29, see
infra note 50.
48
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). For the relevant text of Exchange Act section 10(b),
see supra note 21.
49 Section 27 of the Exchange Act states in part that "[t]he district courts of the
United States and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this
chapter ..
" 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
50 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act establishes that
"[any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an
exchange required thereby shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982).
51
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228. For a discussion of improvements in the arbitration
process, see ilifra notes 55-59 and 68-71 and accompanying text.
52
Id., 482 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added).
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adjudication. 53
c.

Historical Changes in Arbitration

Third, the Court considered the McMahons' assertion that the
three suspect characteristics of arbitration that had weighed heavily
in Wilko's outcome applied with equal force in the instant case. 5 4 In
response to the McMahons' arguments, the majority began by citing
numerous cases that indicated a favorable change in the judiciary's
attitude towards arbitration. 5 5 The Court then stressed that the
1975 amendments to section 19 of the Exchange Act 5 6 gave the
SEC 5 7 "expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration
'5 8 Jusprocedures employed by... [self regulatory organizations]."
53
Comment, PredisputeArbitrationAgreements Between Brokers and Investors: The Extension of Vilko to Section 10(b) Claims, 46 MD. L. REV. 339, 373 (1987).

See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
See, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 62627 (1985) ("[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) ("[Plassage of the [FAA] was motivated first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered,
and we must not overlook this principal objective when construing the statute."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) ("To confine the scope of the [FAA] to
arbitrations sought to be enforced in federal courts could frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a broad enactment ....");Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("[QJuestions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974), quoting The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (The invalidation of an arbitration agreement would allow a
party "to repudiate its solemn promise" and would also reflect a "'parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.' "). For a detailed
discussion of the implications of Byrd, Keating, and Cone, see generally Hirshman, The
Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalizationof Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985).
56 The 1975 amendments stated that,
The [Securities and Exchange] Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add
54
55

to, and delete from ...

the rules of a self-regulatory organization... as

the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to requirements of this chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to such organization, or otherwise in furtherance of the purpose of this chapter....
15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982).
57 The SEC is the agency principally responsible for the enforcement of the federal
securities laws and regulations. It oversees and regulates the activities of stock exchanges and securities associations, including the rules they prescribe for arbitration of
claims against their members.
58 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233. Self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") are the national securities exchanges and the registered securities associations. They include the
American Stock Exchange, the Boston Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board of Options
Exchange, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, the National Association of Securities Dealers, the New York Stock Exchange, the Pacific Stock Exchange, and the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 280-81 n.7 (1984).
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tice O'Connor acknowledged that Wilko's assumptions regarding the
ineffectiveness of arbitration and the SEC's authority might have
been valid in 1953, but asserted that they "most certainly ...do not
hold true today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC's
oversight authority." 5 9 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
where the SEC monitors arbitration procedures, as it did in the
McMahons' case, an arbitration agreement is not a waiver of a plaintiff's substantive rights under the Exchange Act.
2.

The Dissent

The McMahon dissent sharply criticized the majority's narrow
reading of the antiwaiver provisions in both the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act and observed that the two provisions are "virtually identical." 60 Justice Blackmun insisted that the same reasons
that led the Court to preclude arbitration for claims under the civil
liabilities provision of the Securities Act applied to the civil liabilities
provision of the Exchange Act; 6 ' thus Wilko should control Exchange Act claims.
The dissent diverged from the majority's evaluation of arbitration as a plaintiff protective device and adhered to Wilko's analysis.
While acknowledging improvements in the arbitration process subsequent to Wilko, 62 the dissenters did not believe that "arbitration
has changed so significantly as to eliminate the essential characteristics noted by the Wilko Court."6 3 Justice Blackmun argued that
"several aspects of arbitration that were seen by the Wilko court to
be inimical to the policy of investor protection still remain."'6 4 First,
59
60

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233.
Id. at 256 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Some commentary suggests that the differ-

ence between the Securities Act and Exchange Act with regard to these sections is mere
happenstance. See. e.g., Note, drbitrabilityof Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 567; Note, The Securities Exchange Act and the Rule of Exclusive
FederalJurisdiction, 89 YALE L.J. 95, 109 n.58 (1979).
61
.M1c.lahon, 482 U.S. at 256 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 258 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 16390
(Nov. 30, 1979). 44 Fed. Reg. 70616, 70617 (The Uniform Code of Arbitration, which
harmonizes the arbitration procedures among SROs, "marks a substantial improvement
over the various arbitration procedures currently being utilized by the securities industry and represents an important step towards establishing a uniform system for resolving
investor complaints through arbitration."). The Uniform Code also has increased fairness and consistency in arbitration proceedings. Katsoris, supra note 58, at 283-84. For
further discussion of changes in arbitration proceedings, see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text and infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
6 3 .11c.Vahon, 482 U.S. at 259 (Blackmun. J., dissenting).
64
Id. at 257 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun pointed to the lenient
requirements for the preparation of a record, the continued disinterest in announcing
reasons for arbitral decisions, and the substantially limited judicial review of arbitral
rulings as the reasons against compelling arbitration of lOb-5 claims in which plaintiffs
had signed predispute arbitration agreements. Id. at 258-59.
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the FAA does not require arbitrators to provide reasons for their
decisions or to develop complete records. Second, the grounds for
vacating a decision are limited. 65 Furthermore, the dissent charged
that compulsory arbitration forces plaintiffs to arbitrate in fora that
the securities industry controls. Such a result would "directly contradict[] the goal of both securities acts to free the investor from the
control of the market professional," 66 a concern that Justice Reed
67
expressed in Wilko.
C.

Analysis

The Court properly decided McMahon in light of both the improvements in arbitration proceedings since Wilko and the need for
more efficient and economical means of dispute resolution. 68 In
contrast to the dissent's criticisms of the arbitration process, the
SEC, as the official enforcer of the securities laws, 69 expressed its
confidence in arbitration in an amicus brief on behalf of Shearson to
compel arbitration of the McMahons' claims. 70 In addition, the
Court's decisions in the wake of Wilko have reflected the gradual
erosion of society's mistrust of arbitration. 7 t Although the McMa65 See supra note 19 and accompanying text for the FAA's four grounds upon which
to overturn an arbitration decision.
66 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 260 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36.
68 See generally Fletcher, supra note 19, at 458 (footnotes omitted):
Privatization of disputes through arbitration is a good thing, particularly

for securities disputes ....

The parties have an opportunity to avoid

crowded court dockets in favor of a resolution procedure whose average
total time is from four to six months .... Arbitration is also considerably
cheaper than litigation-about one-third the cost, even taking into consideration that both parties may be represented by counsel.... The parties are not the only beneficiaries of [arbitration]. Arbitration promotes
important societal interests as well. Because of the crowded court dockets, for every claim that is litigated, another is left waiting. Thus, to the
extent more cases go to arbitration, more claimants who may not have
agreed to arbitrate their claims will have access to the federal courts. In
addition, the unnecessary litigation of cases in federal court carries with it
enormous dollar costs for society as a whole.
69

See supra note 57.

Brief for Amicus Curiae at 13-21, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44):
The view of arbitration on which Wilko rested is today inappropriate in
cases involving disputes between registered broker-dealers and their cus70

tomers ....

[Given the SEC's broad regulatory authority], the suspicion

of arbitration on which Wilko rested is inappropriate, and an agreement
to arbitrate accordingly should not be deemed a waiver of rights under
the Exchange Act.
Id. at 13.
71
See supra note 55 and accompanying text. McMahon's outcome also is consistent
with the Court's previous commentary on arbitration in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), where it stated that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
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hon majority utilized a narrow reading of Wilko to arrive at its decision, the Court based its decision on the efficiency interests of the
judiciary, the defendants, and the plaintiffs alike. The McMahon dissent failed to appreciate that arbitration proceedings will allow
plaintiffs a speedier and less costly resolution of their disputes. In
fact, plaintiffs unable to commence a formal litigation proceeding
because of its costs could seek redress through arbitration.
III
CLASS ACTIONS AS EFFICIENCY-PROMOTING DEVICES IN
lOb-5 CLAIMS

A.

Advantages of the Class Action Device
1. Suitability of 1Ob-5 Claims to the Class Action Format

Arbitration proceedings allow plaintiffs a speedier and less
costly resolution of their disputes. Class actions offer plaintiffs similar economic advantages. 7 2 Although the popularity of the class action has decreased in recent years, 73 its use in securities litigation
has remained steady. 74 Rule lOb-5 actions usually involve large
numbers of plaintiffs whose claims arise out of the same questions of
law and fact; thus, lOb-5 suits are especially suited to the class action
format. 75
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id at 24-25. See generally Brown, Shell &
Tyson, Arbitration of Customer-Broker Disputes Arising Under the Federal Securities Laws and
RICO, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 7 (1987) ("In the last twelve years, the Supreme Court has
rendered five decisions that have created a favorable climate for commercial arbitration-including arbitration of statutory rights-by dramatically expanding the scope and
applicability of the FAA.").
72 Class actions are authorized under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
73 Several factors have led to this decline. First, the decline in antitrust litigation in
recent years, an area popular for class action suits, see generally 7B WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 5, at § 1781, has decreased the number of lawsuits brought as class actions.
Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. Times,Jan. 8, 1988, at B7, col. 6.
Second, the Supreme Court has restricted class actions through two decisions concerning notice and diversity jurisdiction. In Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173
(1974), the Court held that "[i]ndividual notice must be sent to all class members whose
names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort." The Court further
asserted that notice to class members is not a "discretionary consideration to be
waived." Id. at 176. Finally, it ruled that the class representative must bear the cost of
notice to members of his class. Id. at 177. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301
(1973), held that each class member "in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the
jurisdictional amount [requirement in a federal diversity claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1982)], and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case."
74 Martin, supra note 73, at B7, col. 6 ("[S]ome experts... suggest an area of possible growth [in class action activity] is securities class actions, which have been running
fairly steady for the last decade at about 100 cases a year.").
75 See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969). One court commented that
[c]ontroversies involving widely used contracts of adhesion [such as that
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Rule lOb-5 cases typically satisfy all of the prerequisites for a
class action enumerated in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. First, the plaintiffs tend to be so numerous that it would
76
be impractical for a court to hear each of their claims individually.
Second, the class members usually share identical questions of law
or fact. 77 Third, the alleged claims or defenses of the class representatives often typify the claims and defenses of the other class
members. 78 Fourth, the representatives usually are able to provide
79
adequate representation to absent class members.
Upon satisfying these prerequisites, the class then must fall
under one of the 23(b) categories in order to be certified. Courts
often employ Rule 23(b) (3) in securities litigation ° because subdivision (b)(3) "encompasses those cases in which a class action would
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable
results.""' Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes class actions when the justification for doing so is the existence of common questions of law or fact
and a finding that the class action is superior to other means for
resolving the dispute fairly and efficiently.8 2 "Because most securities cases involve hundreds or thousands of class members who typically possess only small individual claims, the class action provides a
useful mechanism for enforcing the policies underlying the securiused by Shearson in McMahon], present ideal cases for class adjudications; the contracts are uniform, the same principles of interpretation apply to each contract, and all members of the class will share a common
interest in the interpretation of an agreement to which each is a party.
LaSala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal.3d 864, 877, 489 P.2d 1113, 1121, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 849, 857 (1971). In lob-5 actions, a common contractual provision of the customer agreements are the boilerplate arbitration clauses. Such clauses are enforceable
under most federal and state statutes. See M. DOMKE, ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 4.02, at 30 (G. Wilner ed. 1984).
76
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued if"the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
77 One or more members of a class may sue or be sued if "there are questions of
law or fact common to the class." .FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
78
If "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class," one or more members of a class may sue or be sued. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(a)(3).
79
If "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class," one or more members of a class may sue or be sued. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
80
7B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1781, at 4.
81 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966).
82 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) states that:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition ... the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
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ties laws and should be liberally allowed." 8 3
2.

The Class Action as an Efficiency Device

Class actions increase efficiency for society as a whole as well as
for the actors in litigation.8 4 First, courts and society benefit because many individual claims may be resolved concurrently.8 5 This
greatly reduces the judiciary's caseload and saves the taxpayers'
money.8 6 Second, the courts avoid potentially conflicting outcomes,8 7 thereby increasing certainty and fairness in the law. For
example, ten plaintiffs suing individually will receive between zero
and ten favorable judgments. In contrast, those same ten plaintiffs
suing as a class will receive one consistent judgment. Third, many
plaintiffs whose claims are too small to warrant individual litigation
receive the opportunity to join the class, have their day in court, and
share the litigation costs among the entire class.,
3.

Federal Court Recognition of Class Action Advantages

Courts nationwide have recognized the advantages of the class
action.8 9 The Supreme Court has held that class relief is "peculiarly
appropriate" when the "issues involved are common to the class as
a whole" and when they "turn on questions of law applicable in the
same manner to each member of the class." 90 In these types of
cases, "the class-action device saves the resources of both the courts
and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every
[class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule
7B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1781, at 28 and cases cited therein.
Arbitration affords similar benefits to the general public, the disputants, and the
courts. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 458.
85 See Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969); Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated 417 U.S.
156 (1974).
86 Fletcher, supra note 19, at 458.
87 Eisen, 391 F.2d at 560.
88 Id. at 560, 566 n.16. It is important to note that this last attribute of class actions
is virtually identical to a major advantage of arbitration. The cost effectiveness of arbitration proceedings is beneficial to plaintiffs with small claims because the lower cost
may encourage them to bring claims that they otherwise might not litigate. See supra
notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
89 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966);
Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir.), (enl. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Donovan v. University of Texas-El Paso, 643 F.2d 1201, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1981); Hohmann
v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1968); Eisen, 391 F.2d at 560;
Piel v. National Semiconductor Corp., 86 F.R.D. 357, 364, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1980), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985); Steinmetz v. Bache & Co., 71 F.R.D. 202, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Rosenblatt v. Omega Equities Corp., 50 F.R.D. 61, 63-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 7B
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 178 1, at 5 1.
90 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979):
83
84
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23."
Furthermore, as the Second Circuit noted in Eisen v. Carlisle
&Jacquelin,9 2 securities laws depend upon private causes of action
for their effectiveness. 93 Accordingly, "any error, if there is to be
one, should be committed in favor of allowing the class action," because dismissal of a securities class action in many cases will "for all
94
practical purposes terminate the litigation."
B.

Potential Problems with Class Actions

Courts should liberally construe the requirements of the class
action rule in order to implement Rule 23's policy favoring class
actions.9 5 Nevertheless, fear of the due process violations that may
accompany a lOb-5 class action gives rise to substantial court involvement and discretion in utilizing the class action format. The
efficiency of bringing a class action may be offset by a significant
degree of court involvement. In order for plaintiffs to bring a class
action, the court must certify a class prior to the commencement of
the litigation; 96 the decision to certify rests on the meeting of Rule
23(a)'s requirements. 9 7 In essence, Rule 23 obliges the court to
carefully monitor the case in order to protect class members'
98
rights.
Another possible shortcoming of the 23(b)(3) class action lies in
the stringent notice requirements that the Supreme Court announced in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin.9 9 In Eisen, the Court ruled
that any potential class member who can reasonably be notified of
91
92

Id. at 701.
391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).

93
Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969); Bernfeld, Class Actions and Federal Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 78, 85
(1969).
94 Eisen, 391 F.2d at 566-67 (citations omitted).
95 Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 281 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
96 The certification process is extensive and its primary purpose is to protect absentee class members from entry of binding judgment when their interests have not been
adequately represented. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F. Supp. 1379
(D. Md. 1983); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 80 F.R.D. 32, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
97 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
98 McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1981) (district
court properly denied class certification where plaintiffs failed to pursue discovery for
two years and lacked financial resources to maintain a class suit).
9 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See supra note 73. Prior to Eisen, the notice requirements
that accompanied a Rule 23(b)(3) class action were less onerous. Rule 23(c)(2) provides
that if a court permits a class action under subdivision (b)(3), it must order "the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Lower
courts, attempting to prevent undue burdens on class representatives, held that individual notice was not automatically required and that judges had leeway in prescribing the
type of notice. See. e.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (Requiring
individual notice to each identifiable class member would "stymie the purpose of the
class action device.").
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the class's formation must receive such notification at the plaintiffs'
expense.' 0 0 The Court, in strong language, asserted that "[t]here is
nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that the notice requirements [of Rule
23(c)(2)] can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs.10 Thus, it is well-settled that in Rule 23(b)(3) actions, all identifiable class members must be given individual notice despite the
cost that may be involved. 10 2 This ruling unquestionably undermined the class action by detracting from its economic efficiency.
These problems notwithstanding, the total cost of bringing a
given number of separate actions is substantially greater than the
cost of litigating collectively in a class action. Analogizing this reasoning to an arbitration proceeding, "it is at least doubtful that [the
advantages of arbitration] could compensate for the unfairness inherent in forcing hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of individuals asserting claims involving common issues of fact and law to litigate
them in separate proceedings against a party with vastly superior
03
resources."1
IV
CLASSWIDE ARBrrRATION OF

10b-5

CLAIMS

Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered the merits
of classwide arbitration, McMahon's result logically suggests that the
classwide arbitration issue will arise with respect to lOb-5 actions in
the near future. Customers who have agreed to arbitrate claims
against their brokers often will wish to pursue their lawsuits as a
class, as lOb-5 plaintiffs traditionally have done.
In the aftermath of McMahon, judicial validation of classwide arbitration for actions arising under Rule lOb-5 is necessary to protect
plaintiffs' rights for two reasons. First, McMahon compels arbitration of lOb-5 claims in cases where customers have signed predispute arbitration agreements. Thus the class action format will
effectively be extinguished as an option for plaintiffs if the courts
find classwide arbitration impermissible. Logically, if arbitration is
required and if courts deem class actions to be incompatible with
100

Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173.
Id. at 176.
See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482
102
U.S. 915 (1987); In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 574 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1978); In re
Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1986); Piel v. National Semiconductor Corp., 86 F.R.D. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1980), cerl. denied,
474 U.S. 903 (1985); Robinson v. First Nat'I City Bank, 482 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
103
Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 609, 645 P.2d 1192, 1207, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 375 (1982), rev'd on othergrounds sub nor. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1 (1984).
101
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arbitration, then class actions will be precluded in the lOb-5 setting.
In essence, the judiciary will have added efficiency in one area (arbitration), and subtracted it in another (class actions). Second, securities brokers may insert boilerplate arbitration clauses into their
customer agreements in order to prevent class actions. "If... an
arbitration clause may be used to insulate the drafter of an adhesive
contract from any form of class proceeding, effectively foreclosing
many individual claims, it may well be oppressive and may defeat
04
the expectations of the nondrafting party."'
If the Court deems class arbitration impermissible, then the efficiency created through McMahon may be lost. Rule lOb-5 plaintiffs
who might have reaped the benefits of class action litigation will lose
that option once arbitration of their claims is compelled. The
strong federal policy favoring both class actions and arbitration 0 5
suggests that the judiciary should permit the combination of the two
devices rather than simply preclude class actions when courts compel arbitration. The fact that the parties contracted to arbitrate does
not evidence an intent to foreclose class proceedings in resolving
their disputes.
Two options exist in the post-McMahon era. First, courts can
hold that arbitrations are necessarily and inherently incompatible
with class actions and that the public policy favoring arbitration predominates. This will foreclose class action opportunities to 1Ob-5
claimants who sign arbitration clauses. Second, the judiciary can approve the classwide arbitration device for lOb-5 actions. This Note
asserts that the latter option will increase efficiency for the courts
and parties while simultaneously protecting the rights of the
plaintiffs.
A.

Keating v. Superior Court: A Discussion of Consolidation of
Arbitrations and its Relation to Classwide Arbitration
1. Consolidation Doctrine

The policies underlying class actions are similar to those favoring the doctrine of consolidation.' 0 6 In consolidated proceedings,
Id. at 610, 645 P.2d at 1207, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
See supra notes 37-42 and 89-94 and accompanying text.
106 Wright and Miller state that
[c]onsolidation of actions presenting a common issue of law or fact is
permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration.
The court is given broad discretion to decide whether consolidation
would be desirable. The consent of the parties is not required. It is for
the court to weigh the saving of time and effort that consolidation would
produce against any inconvenience, delay, or expense that it would cause.
(footnotes omitted) 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 2383, at 259.
104
105
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courts encourage (and sometimes order) parties with claims arising
out of the same law and facts to bring their lawsuits simultaneously
in one forum. 10 7 Many cases assert that the consolidation of arbitration proceedings is permissible. 0 8 While the FAA does not specifically provide for the consolidation of arbitrations, courts have
observed that the statute's liberal purposes suggest that consolidation of arbitration proceedings is both permitted and encouraged. 10 9 The courts prefer consolidation when presented with
common questions of law and fact and a danger of conflicting findings. Class actions are favored for similar purposes.' 10 Like consol107
See Annotation, State Court's Power to ConsolidateArbitrationProceedings, 64 A.L.R.3d
528, 530 (1975). In fact, some courts argue that Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure mandates such consolidation. "When actions involving a common question
of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order ajoint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a). See Vigo S.S. Corp. v. Marship Corp., 26 N.Y.2d
157, 309 N.Y.S.2d 165, 257 N.E.2d 624, cert. denied, sub. nor. Frederick Share Corp. v.
Vigo S.S. Corp., 400 U.S. 819 (1970). There, the New York Court of Appeals stated in
dicta that
the contention as to a lack of power to [order consolidation] flies in the
face of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 42(a) provides expressly for consolidation in situations involving common questions of law
or fact and the Federal Rules generally are made applicable to the [FAA]
as to matters of procedure not covered by the [FAA]....
26 N.Y.2d at 162-63, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 169, 257 N.E.2d at 626. The court noted that the
FAA "is silent as to the question of consolidating arbitration proceedings." Id, See also
Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72
IOWA L. REV. 473, 491 (1987) (Federal courts often rely on the consolidation provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "which are deemed to apply to judicial proceedings enforcing agreements to arbitrate in the absence of express language in the FAA.").
108 See, e.g., Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527
F.2d 966, 975 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F.
Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 789 (3d Cir. 1975); Sociedad Anonima de Navegacion
Petrolera v. Compania de Petroleos de Chile, S.A., 634 F. Supp. 805, 809 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); In re Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 512 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Marine
Trading Ltd. v. Ore Int'l Corp., 432 F. Supp. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Robinson v.
Warner, 370 F. Supp. 828, 831 (D.R.I. 1974). See also Stipanowich, supra note 107, at
489-90:
The trend ... under both federal and state statutes is to allow consolidation of arbitrations that involve common issues of law and fact, at least
when none of the pertinent arbitration provisions expressly excludes consolidation and the likelihood of substantial prejudice does not outweigh
the time and expense involved in separate actions or the possibility of
conflicting awards.
Contra, Weyerhaueser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984); Ore & Chem. Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc., 606 F.
Supp. 1510, 1516 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
109
Compania Espanola, 527 F.2d at 975. See also Czarnikow, 512 F. Supp. at 1309
("Courts have frequently ordered consolidated arbitration proceedings when the interests ofjustice so require either because the issues in dispute are substantially the same
and/or because a substantial right might be prejudiced if separate arbitration proceedings are conducted.").
110 See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
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idations, class actions arise, in part, from the desire to combine
similar claims in one forum.
2. Keating v. Superior Court
In Keatingv. SuperiorCourt, " 'I the California Supreme Court recognized the authority to order classwide arbitrations as existing
within the penumbra of the courts' express statutory power to consolidate arbitrations.' t2 The decision considered the right of franchisees to jointly arbitrate their common law and statutory claims
against their franchisor. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' interests would seriously be prejudiced by mandating individual arbitrations of their respective claims. 1"3 Keating reasoned that an order
for classwide arbitration in an adhesion contract context (such as is
typical with broker-dealer customer agreements in lOb-5 actions)
would call for substantially "less intrusion upon the contractual as114
pects of the relationship" than consolidation would occasion.
The class members would all be parties to an agreement with the
defendant and the arbitration clauses would all contain similar language. 1 5 Accordingly, the Keating court concluded that the California legislature, in allowing the consolidation of arbitration
proceedings, could not have intended to preclude a court from or16
dering classwide arbitration."
Keating acknowledged that courts would have to make decisions
regarding certification and notice, and "exercise a measure of external supervision in order to safeguard the rights of absent class members to adequate representation. ' 17 Furthermore, care would be
necessary to avoid adjudication on the merits of the conflict and to
"minimize complexity, costs, or delay. ' 118 Despite Keating's concern over the juxtaposition of judicial involvement and arbitration,
l11 31 Cal.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982), rev'don othergroundssub
nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
112 See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 1982), which states that
consolidated arbitration may be compelled where one party is a party to a
separate arbitration agreement or proceeding with a third party; and
[t]he disputes arise from the same transactions or series of related transactions; and [tihere is common issue or issues of law or fact creating the
possibility of conflicting rulings by more than one arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators.
Id. If the arbitration agreements are distinct, a court may appoint an arbitrator to "resolve [any conflicts] and determine the rights and duties of the various parties to achieve
substantial justice under all circumstances." Id.
113 Keating, 31 Cal.3d at 609, 645 P.2d at 1207, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
114
Id. at 612, 645 P.2d at 1209, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
115

Id. See M. DOMKE, supra note 75.

116

Keating, 31 Cal.3d at 613, 645 P.2d at 1209, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 377.

117
118

Id.
Id.
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the court approved the classwide arbitration device. The decision
became the "first of its kind in the nation .... [and] promise[d] to
have profound impact on the way disputes arising out of contracts of
adhesion [would] be resolved."1 9 Although Keating was not a lOb-5
action, Keating's reasoning unequivocably applies to securities fraud
claims.
3.

Consolidations and Class Actions Distinguished

Unlike class actions, in consolidations all parties are present to
represent their own individual interests. In class actions, one class
representative is the champion of the class and most other participants in the class are absent from the proceedings. As a result, due
process issues arise in the class action contex in the form of con20
cerns over sufficiency of notice and adequacy of representation.
B. Judicial Treatment of Class Arbitration Subsequent to
Keating
The classwide arbitration question appeared before the
Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v. Keating,121 an appeal of the California Keating decision. The Court, however, refused to consider
22
the issue because it lacked jurisdiction to make a determination.
Instead, the Court recognized that arbitrability of class actions had
been approved in principle by the California Supreme Court.
23
Other California courts have followed Keating's reasoning.'
In Lewis v. PrudentialBache Sec., Inc.,1 24 the California Court of Appeal noted that the "alternative to class arbitration... [was] to force
each . . . customer to individually arbitrate claims, most of which
probably [could] not justify the time and money required to
119 The California Supreme Court Survey, A Review of Decisions: January 1982-June 1982,
10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 167, 177, 178 (1982).
120
"The touchstones of due process in class actions have always been notice and
adequacy of representation .. " In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 502 F.2d 834, 842
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, sub. nom. Ohio v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 419 U.S. 1034 (1974).
See also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U S. 32, 44-45 (1940) (The Court's due process analysis of
the class action centered on the question of adequacy of representation.); National Ass'n
of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, sub. nom. National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs v. Califano, 431 U.S. 954
(1977) (Courts must sustain a careful and persistent evaluation of the adequacy of representation.). For a further discussion of the due process concerns involved in class actions, see infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
121
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
122
Id. at 8-9. The Court lacked jurisdiction because "it [did] not affirmatively appear that the validity of the state statute was 'drawn into question' on federal grounds, by
Southland." Id. (emphasis in original).
123
Izzy v. Mesquite Country Club, 186 Cal.App.3d 1309, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1986);
Lewis v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 179 Cal.App.3d 935, 225 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1986).
124
179 Cal.App.3d 935, 225 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1986).
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prove."125 The court concluded that arbitration properly could
arise in a class action context provided there was adequate judicial
supervision over the class aspects.
In Izzy v. Mesquite Country Club, 12 6 the court of appeal recognized
that both class actions and arbitration are "regularly acknowledged
to be valuable procedures for expediting dispute resolution and
ameliorating the burdens of formal litigation."'' 27 The Izzy court
concluded that "in cases in which the class action and arbitration
devices would both appear to be appropriate and useful, recognition of a combined 'classwide arbitration' mechanism, if properly
administered and judiciously applied, might possibly preserve the
essential values of both devices." 2 8 The court attributed its doubts
about the compatibility of arbitration and class actions to "considerable judicial precedent" against such a hybrid device.' 29 The Izzy
court refuted these cases by arguing that the proper administration
of the classwide arbitration mechanism "might possibly preserve the
essential values of both devices."' 3 0 Additionally, it relied on Keating as authority that California already had recognized the existence
3
of classwide arbitration.' '
C. Judicial Involvement in Classwide Arbitration
One theme stressed throughout the California state class arbitration cases and, to a lesser extent, in the arbitration consolidation
cases, is that ofjudicial involvement.132 The issue arises in consideration of classwide arbitration because class actions require great
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 946, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 75.

186 Cal.App.3d 1309, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1986).
Id. at 1319, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
Id. at 1321, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
Id. These prior cases had ruled that the policy favoring arbitration prevailed
over the policy favoring class actions. Izzy cited only three cases to show "considerable
judicial precedent" against superimposing class actions on arbitration proceedings.
First, it cited Keating for the proposition that class actions and arbitration inherently are
incompatible; a mischaracterization because Keating approved classwide arbitration.
Second, Izzy cited Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal.App.3d 706, 715, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 147, 152-53 (1975) ("[T]he policy of law favoring arbitration prevails over the
policy of law pertaining to class actions."). The Vernon court's three reasons for this
conclusion were: 1) arbitration is a favored means of dispute resolution; 2) there is
perhaps no higher ppblic policy than to uphold private contracts; and 3) the substantive
law of contracts prevails over class actions, which are merely procedural devices. Third,
Izzy recognized Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 82 A.D.2d 87, 95, 441 N.Y.S.2d
70, 74-76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 627, 450 N.Y.S.2d 482, 435 N.E.2d
1097 (1982) ("[A]rbitration provides a relatively uncostly procedure for resolving...
dispute[s] ....

[M]aintenance of a class action here by assertion of a claim for which a

forum is provided elsewhere, would defeat the aim of arbitration, and undercut an
avowed purpose of the class action itself-the 'conservation ofjudicial effort.' ").
130
IzzvY, 186 CaLApp.3d at 1321, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
131
132

Id.

See Keating. 31 Cal.3d at 613, 645 P.2d at 1209, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 377; Izzy, 186

1989]

CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION

401

judicial discretion, while arbitrations operate outside the judiciary.
Judicial involvement is inappropriate in a pure arbitration setting
because the primary rationale of arbitration is to allow an alternative
forum to the courts. However, the fact that classwide arbitration is a
hybrid device in which the courts would superimpose these two efficiency instruments requires some degree ofjudicial involvement. In
approving the hybrid device, courts must create a middle ground
between excessive judicial involvement and a dormant judiciary.
In class actions, courts have a substantial degree of discretion in
34
considering the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, 133 certifying the class,'
35
and determining notice requirements.
Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure grants this discretion because class actions
present a unique situation in which plaintiffs press their claims without being present in court, relying instead on a class representative.
The court's duty, therefore, is to monitor the creation of the class to
ensure that the representative adequately supports the interests of
each class member according to the requirements of Federal Rule
23.136

1. Due Process Concerns
The majority of class action participants are absent from the
proceedings; thus, the class action device raises due process concerns. These issues arise predominantly in two areas. The first contemplates notice requirements crucial to the scheme of Rule
23(b)(3).1 3 7 Notice informs absentees that their dispute is in litigation so that they can act to protect their interests. "In this way, [notice] guarantees each class member an opportunity to have his day
in court or, at least, to oversee the conduct of the action by the representatives."' 38 Without such requirements, it would be unconsti39
tutional to enforce a judgment against absent class members.'
The second due process issue that courts have raised in class
Cal.App.3d at 1321, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 321; Lewis, 179 Cal.App.3d at 945, 225 Cal. Rptr.
at 75.
133
See supra notes 76-79 for a discussion of Rule 23(a). For examples of grants of
court discretion, see Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 936-38 (10th Cir. 1982), cerl.
denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983), and McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d
554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981), for a grant of court discretion.
134
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
135 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
136 See, e.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1259 (5th Cir. 1979);
Handwerger v. Ginsberg, 519 F.2d 1339, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975).
137
7B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1786, at 188. 1Ob-5 actions based on Federal Rule 23(b)(3) are common. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
138 7B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1786, at 190.
139 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Eisen v.
Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568 (2d Cir. 1968).
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actions is whether the class representatives adequately represent the
interests of the absent class members. 40 Adequate representation
is "especially important in Rule 23(b)(3) actions because the class
members are only loosely associated by common questions of law or
fact, rather than by any pre-existing or continuing legal
relationship." 141
These same due process concerns would predominate in the
classwide arbitration context. In spite of the fact that courts traditionally hesitate to intervene in an arbitral forum, judicial discretion
must exist in the classwide arbitration setting if courts are to protect
the absent class members' due process rights.
2. Resolution of the Conflicting Arbitration and Class Action Policies
a. CongressionalIntent
The judicial involvement inherent in classwide arbitration 4 2 directly contradicts the "unmistakably clear congressional purpose [in
the FAA] that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts."' 143 Admittedly, arbitration is intended to
operate outside the jurisdiction of the courts, and class action procedures imposed upon the arbitration setting would undercut some
of the benefits of arbitration. 144 However, the legislators who enacted the FAA apparently did not foresee the litigation burdens confronting today's judiciary, the complexity with which litigation has
developed, or the implications of the McMahon decision. In light of
these developments, Congress's inaction on the issue may not necessarily indicate an implied prohibition against classwide
arbitration.
b.

The Hybrid Device Still Promotes Expediency

Judicial involvement in classwide arbitration does not per se negate all the benefits of arbitration. Undoubtedly, some of the advantages of arbitration will be diluted by the imposition of a class
structure in which courts actively participate. Courts should avoid
unnecessary intrusions that would inhibit arbitration's function as a
140
141
142

See supra note 120.
7B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1786, at 194.

In classwide arbitration, judicial involvement would arise in the form of class
certification and due process protection. Courts protect class members' due process
rights by invoking notice requirements and scrutinizing the adequacy of representation
by the class representatives. For a discussion of three proposed models for classwide
arbitration, see infra Part IV.E.
143 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
144
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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speedy, economical, and thorough proceeding, with no judicial involvement.1 4 5 However, if the alternative is to compel hundreds or
thousands of individual plaintiffs to arbitrate each of their disputes
in separate fora, then the prospect of the hybrid classwide arbitration device will offer a "better, more efficient, and fairer
46
solution."1
D.

The Hybrid Device and the Existing FAA Model are
Compatible

Opponents of court-ordered consolidation insist that the absence of express statutory or contractual authority extends consolidation beyond the control of the courts. 14 7 Ideally, an arbitration
should proceed completely independent of thejudiciary. Inevitably,
however, cases arise in which court involvement is necessary "to effectuate the arbitration agreement or the arbitrators's actions under
the agreement."' 148 For example, courts are empowered to enforce
arbitration clauses' 4 9 and sometimes appoint arbitrators. 50 There
also are provisions for limited judicial review of arbitral awards. 15 '
Such judicial discretion appears to be warranted in the face of complex multiparty disputes. Thus, while limitations on court participation in arbitration proceedings clearly are desirable, such restraints
should not interfere with judicial efforts to advance the goals of arbitration-speed, economy, finality, and the liberal enforcement of
52
arbitration agreements.'
E. A Classwide Arbitration Model
"Classwide arbitration,as Sir Winston Churchillsaid of democracy, must be
evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but in relation to its
alternatives."153
Court approval of the classwide arbitration device requires constructing a model for how such proceedings should evolve. Arbitrating as a class will necessitate some degree of judicial
intervention at the outset to allow courts to monitor the certification
process. Once the class is certified, the class representative will apIzzy, 186 Cal.App.3d 1321, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 613, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 377 (1982), rev'don othergrounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1 (1984).
147
Stipanowich, supra note 107, at 509.
145

146

148

Id.

149

9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (1982).
9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
9 U.S.C. §§ 9-12 (1982).
Stipanowich, supra note 107, at 512.
Keating, 31 Cal.3d 584, 613, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 377.

150

151
152

153
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pear before the arbitration panel as the champion of her class.
Classwide arbitration, however, may sacrifice due process protections if court involvement in the proceedings decreases or ceases
upon certification.
Three options should be considered with respect to court involvement in classwide arbitration proceedings. First, the certifying
court could decide interlocutory appeals on questions of the adequacy of class proceedings in arbitration. One of thejudiciary's due
process responsibilities is to "undertake a stringent and continuing
examination of the adequacy of representation by the named class
representatives at all stages of the litigation."'15 4 Such appeals
would surely delay the arbitration process and detract from its efficiency and economy. However, the advantages to plaintiffs of bringing 10b-5 claims as class actions remain. 155
The second option may prove more protective of arbitration's
efficiency. Once the court certifies the class, the arbitration can proceed without any appeals as to the adequacy of the class. Thus no
judicial involvement during the arbitration will occur. To the extent
that absent class members are concerned about the failure to meet
any of the Rule 23(a) requirements, they can appeal these issues to
the certifying court at the conclusion of the arbitration.
If a court finds, for example, that the class representative did
not adequately represent the class, it can nullify the arbitration ruling as against the class. The ruling will stand with respect to the
class representative, but not with respect to other plaintiffs' claims.
Because the class representative would likely have arbitrated her
claim individually had she not championed the class, the arbitration
proceeding will have been worthwhile even if it is adjudged ineffective as against the entire class. The class members who the court
subsequently removes from the arbitration may then proceed individually or establish a new class. This model avoids court intervention during the actual arbitration, but sanctions such involvement
before and after the proceedings.
The third option is arguably the most efficient method for the
hybrid arbitration. This model would allow the arbitrators alone to
oversee the certification process. Such a model might allay the
skepticism of arbitration purists who insist that court involvement
and arbitration are mutually exclusive. It is not viable, however, if
courts adequately are to protect plaintiffs' interests; due process issues connected with class action aspects of classwide arbitration are
154
National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340,
344 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, sub. nom. National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs,
Inc. v. Califano 431 U.S. 954 (1977).
155
See supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
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simply too important to be relegated to arbitrators. While the panelists in a lOb-5 arbitration may be experts in securities regulation,
they are not experts in the constitutional concerns attached to class
certification. 1 5 6 As a result, they cannot ensure the fairness of the
proceedings to all absent class members.
Moreover, the FAA does not require arbitrators to give reasons
or create records for their findings.' 5 7 Therefore, the courts' traditional outsider status in arbitration notwithstanding, court involvement must exist in the classwide arbitration setting in order to attain
the optimum balance between efficiency for the parties and courts,
and procedural due process for the plaintiffs.
The second option-arbitration without court involvement during the actual proceedings, but with class certification hearings at
the filing of the action and a freer appeals process at the close of the
arbitration-presents the most effective means of protecting all interests involved. Conceivably, intermittent appeals during the
course of a classwide arbitration (the first model described above)
may be too inapposite to arbitration policy to gain judicial and/or
congressional approval. On the other hand, the second option supports the current arbitration process, and argues only for class action rights on both ends of arbitration proceedings. This option
retains the integrity of arbitration and class action proceedings.
Thus, courts will be more likely to approve the hybrid device if this
model is adopted.
CONCLUSION

The McMahon decision dramatically changed the face of dispute
resolution in lOb-5 actions. In the past, all plaintiffs adjudicated
their lawsuits if they so desired, and did so either individually or as a
class. In the wake of McMahon, plaintiffs, upon signing customer
156

T.

One commentator noted that
[t]here are no strict qualifications to serve as an arbitrator-it is not necessary to be an attorney, although legal training is evidently helpful. The
most important quality is expertise in the subject of the dispute, both in
the knowledge of how problems arise as well as how best to resolve them.

OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

§ 9:4, at 162-63 (1987). This passage suggests

that arbitrators in securities disputes will be unqualified to resolve due process issues in
classwide arbitration. In fact, allowing arbitrators to do so might, in itself, deprive plaintiffs of due process. Oehmke writes that
[lihe arbitrator is not bound by rules of law. evidence, or procedure unless the

parties specifically provide. The arbitrator is free to follow the broader
principles of equity. In some cases, where the rule of law is clear, arbitrators may be mandated to follow it, but these situations are the exception.
Fairness, as a basic premise, governs.
Id. § 2:7, at 27-28 (emphasis added).
157
See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203-04 & n.4 (1956). See also
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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agreements with arbitration clauses, now encounter compulsory arbitration of all claims arising under the Exchange Act. Thus courts
must consider whether McMahon, by precluding adjudication in such
instances, also precluded the opportunity for class action proceedings. Court approval of a hybrid classwide arbitration device in 10b5 actions is most likely to protect plaintiffs' interests. While such a
device is not completely devoid of judicial involvement, as arbitration customarily is, the classwide arbitration device is an untraditional mode of dispute resolution. The ultimate solution lies in the
hands of Congress, which should signal support for the device by
amending the FAA. Until such time, however, the judiciary must
continue to search for the proper medium between efficiency and
equity. In the lOb-5 context, the classwide arbitration device would
serve both goals.
Daniel R. WaItcher

